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TOWARDS JUDICIAL COORDINATION FOR GOOD WATER
GOVERNANCE?
VIRGINIE BARRAL*
Abstract This article explores the procedural environmental rights
practice of regional human rights and environmental protection systems
through a comparative lens in order to identify the ways in which
existing developments and current trends can inform and enrich the
procedural dimension of the right to water. The study suggests that
enhanced levels of transparency, public engagement and justiciability in
water-related decisions are signiﬁcant steps towards the achievement of
the substantive dimension of the right to water and highlights the
potential for cross-fertilization between such regimes towards good
water governance.
Keywords: Aarhus Convention, commodity, democratic accountability, participation,
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1. INTRODUCTION
Despite ongoing controversies about the nature of the right to water,
its scope, and its recognition in international law,1 it is generally accepted
that, in terms of content and structure, the right has both substantive and
procedural dimensions.2 The substantive dimension involves obligations
relating to availability, quality and accessibility3 and generally includes: an
obligation to respect, which precludes States from depriving individuals of
existing access to water; an obligation to protect, requiring mechanisms to be
enacted to prevent violations by non-State entities; and an obligation to fulﬁl
* Associate Professor in Law, University of Hertfordshire, v.barral@herts.ac.uk.
1 On the question of its nature and scope, controversies relate to the right to water as a derivative
treaty right, as a customary international law right, as a civil and political right, and as an economic
social and cultural right and to the scope and extent of the obligations to which it gives rise. See eg P
Thielbörger, ‘Re-Conceptualising the Human Right to Water: A Pledge for a Hybrid Approach’
(2015) 15 HRLR 225. On its contested recognition in international law, see SC McCaﬀrey, ‘The
Human Right to Water: A False Promise?’ (2016) 47 University of the Paciﬁc Law Review 221.
2 See eg J Viñuales, ‘A Human Rights Approach to Extraterritorial Environmental Protection?
An Assessment’ in N Bhuta (ed), The Frontiers of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2016)
205; E Riedel and P Rothen (eds), The Human Right to Water (BW-Verlag 2006) 177. For a recent
analysis see M Arden, ‘Water for All? Developing a Human Right to Water in National and
International Law’ (2016) 65(4) ICLQ 771.
3 Gen CommNo 15: The Right toWater, para 12(a), (b) and (c), Economic Social and Cultural
Rights Committee, 2003, Doc E/C.12/2002/11.
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the right, which demands its progressive realization.4 The procedural dimension
of the right, however, particularly emphasizes principles of transparency,
information, participation and justice.5 In the environmental context, these
principles have gained increased signiﬁcance over the last 20 years, and they
play a prominent role in bridging the gap between human rights law and
environmental protection.6 Tentatively elaborated initially in principle 10 of
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in 1992, the principles
of access to information, public participation and access to justice now
constitute a set of sophisticated and widely recognized environmental rights.
Such rapid evolution has been aided greatly by the adoption, in 1998, of the
Aarhus Convention on access to information, public participation in decision
making and access to justice in environmental matters, whose innovative
non-compliance committee—which receives communications from the
public—has developed a rich body of jurisprudence.7 Concomitantly, human
rights law has started to embrace the justiciability of environmental concerns
particularly in their procedural dimensions, including in the context of water
rights. This evolution is especially true of the European human rights system,8
but such developments are also found in the African and American systems
when they engage with water-related human rights claims. The rise of water-
related claims before judicial or quasi-judicial bodies from both human rights
and environmental protection systems conﬁrms the hybrid nature of the right to
water, being at the intersection of individual and environmental concerns.
The increased prominence of the right to water has been the subject of a recent
study in this journal, which surveyed signiﬁcant water rights developments both
in international law and in a number of domestic contexts, and it argued for the
broad recognition of a right to an acceptable minimum of water.9 The present
contribution complements this earlier analysis by focussing on the procedural
dimension of the right to water. It explores the water- and, more broadly,
environment-related, procedural rights practice of regional human rights
regimes. The objectives are threefold. First, it aims to identify the ways in
which existing developments and current trends in procedural environmental
practice in human rights and environmental protection systems can inform
and enrich the procedural dimension of the right to water. Second, it
4 See Realising the Human Rights to Water and Sanitation: A Handbook, UN Special
Rapporteur de Albuquerque, Booklet 1: Introduction 26–7.
5 See Viñuales (n 2); Riedel and Rothen (n 2); Realising the Human Rights to Water and
Sanitation (n 4) Booklet 6: Justice.
6 See A Boyle, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?’ (2012) 23(3) EJIL 613,
621–6. 7 As of 1 January 2018, there had been 148 communications from the public.
8 Especially in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), although
the European Committee on Social Rights and the EU system also have roles to play in this
context. The EU’s contribution in particular is fed both by its Member States’ participation in the
ECHR and the Aarhus Convention, as well as its own individual participation in the Aarhus
Convention. This participation arguably gives rise to a fertile cross-system dialogue to which this
article, due to space constraints, could not do justice and is thus beyond the remit of the present
contribution. 9 Arden (n 2).
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investigates whether and how enhanced levels of transparency, public
engagement and justiciability in water-related decisions can be signiﬁcant for
the achievement of the substantive dimension of the right to water and
enhanced eﬀectiveness of water-related rights more generally. Finally, it
seeks to draw lessons from the comparative practice of these judicial and
quasi-judicial bodies and endeavours in particular to identify the potential for
cross-fertilization of such practices across both regions and systems. To
achieve these objectives, section II explores both the features of the
procedural dimension of the right to water and its contribution to the right to
water debate, including the beneﬁts that can be derived from good water
governance. Section III analyses the relevant procedural practices of a
number of regimes whose work is particularly helpful for claims relating to
the right to water. The section focuses on the practices of the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR), the inter-American Commission and Court of
Human Rights (IACHR) and the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), as well as on that of the Aarhus Convention
Compliance Committee and the emerging practice under the 1999 London
Protocol on Water and Health.10 Both the general and speciﬁc contributions
made by these regimes to the procedural dimension of the right to water are
evaluated. In section IV some conclusions are drawn concerning the lessons
that can be learned from this practice.
II. THE PROCEDURAL DIMENSION OF THE RIGHT TO WATER: CONTOURS AND SIGNIFICANCE
A. The Contours of the Procedural Dimension of the Right to Water
When looking for the content and structure of the right to water, one obvious
point of reference is General Comment 15 of the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights.11 This General Comment, which deﬁnes the right
to water as emanating from, and as indispensable for, the realization of the
right to an adequate standard of living (Article 11 ICESCR) and also as being
inextricably related to the right to health (Article 12 ICESCR), delves into both
its normative content and the speciﬁc obligations to which it gives rise. It says
that the right ‘entitles everyone to suﬃcient, safe, acceptable, physically
accessible and aﬀordable water for personal and domestic uses’12 and, like
any other human right, imposes on States the obligation to respect, protect
and fulﬁl.13 As many economic and social rights, it is a right of progressive
realization and which is subject to the State’s available resources. Hence, the
right to water mainly imposes relative rather than absolute obligations:
obligations of means, to deploy suﬃcient eﬀorts and undertake necessary
steps towards the achievement of the right, rather than obligations of
10 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol 2331 at 202; ECOSOC DocMP.WAT/AC.1/1999/1 of 24
March 1999. 11 Gen Comm 15 (2002) UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11. 12 ibid para 2.
13 ibid paras 20–29.
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immediate eﬀect. However, as reasserted in General Comment 15, all covenant
rights also give rise to core obligations which are of immediate eﬀect: to ensure
the enjoyment of minimum essential levels of the right, such as access to
the minimum essential amount of water, in a non-discriminatory manner, and
the obligation to take steps towards its fulﬁlment.14
The themes of access to information, public participation, transparency and
accountability, which reﬂect key aspects of procedural rights, run through the
document and inform not only the normative content of the right to water but
also the obligations of States parties and the recommendations of the committee
concerning the implementation of the right at national levels. The procedural
dimension of the right to water thus feeds into essential features of its
substantive dimension and, in particular, those of water availability, quality
and accessibility. Indeed, according to the General Comment, accessibility
must include (inter alia) the right to seek, receive and impart information
concerning water issues.15 Including women and indigenous communities in
participatory decision-making processes is also seen as an element of the
States’ duties to ensure non-discrimination and equality.16 Where water
services are operated by third parties, in order to prevent abuses, States must
establish an eﬀective regulatory system, including genuine public
participation.17 States are also under an obligation to adopt and implement a
national water strategy and plan of action, devised on the basis of a
participatory and transparent process.18 Crucially, this last obligation is listed
among the core obligations of States, which are of immediate eﬀect,
are non-derogable and for which non-compliance is not justiﬁable.19 The
meaning of this obligation is further elaborated in the section concerning
recommendations for national-level implementation. Not only is the strategy
to be adopted on the basis of public participation, but there must also be
a right to participate in any decision-making process potentially aﬀecting
the exercise of the right to water in any policy, programme or strategy
concerning water.20 In addition, individuals and groups should be provided
access to information concerning water which is held by public authorities
and third parties,21 and actions interfering with the right to water should only
be implemented following genuine opportunities for consultation and full
information on the measures have been disclosed and reasonable notice
given.22 Finally, where this has not been the case, and where there has been a
denial of the right to water, eﬀective judicial or other remedies should be
available.23 Ultimately, fulﬁlment of the right to water, as set out in General
14 For further analysis of the General Comment, see M Fitzmaurice, ‘The Human Right to
Water’ (2007) 18 FordhamEnvtlLRev. 537, 549–57; P Thielbörger (n 1) 229–32; A Cahill, ‘The
Human Right to Water – A Right of Unique Status: The Legal Status and Normative Content of
the Right to Water’ (2005) 9 IJHR 389, 392–3. 15 Gen Comm (n 11) para 22(c)(4).
16 See ibid para 16 (a) and (d). 17 See ibid para 24. 18 ibid para 37(f).
19 ibid para 40. 20 ibid para 48. 21 ibid. 22 ibid para 56.
23 ibid para 55 and 56.
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Comment 15, is premised upon, and largely depends upon, principles of good
governance, transparency, participation and accountability.
According to Morgan, this elaborate procedural framework and in particular
the duty to aﬀord full access to information concerning water held by
public authorities or third parties goes ‘well beyond many domestic legal
systems even in developed countries’.24 Nevertheless, the procedural design
found in the General Comment is far from being an isolated example and
the provision of participatory rights and procedural safeguards infuse a
substantial number of water-related international instruments. Some examples
include Chapter 18 of Agenda 21 on freshwater resources, which emphasizes
the role of public participation in relation to the supply of drinking water and
sanitation and which encourages water development and management based
on a participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy makers.25
The International Law Association’s (ILA) Berlin Rules on Water Resources
Law require that the right of access to water be subject to periodic review on
the basis of a participatory and transparent process.26 The rules also require a
process of public participation for decisions relating to the management of
waters. Access to information, which must itself be based on relevant impact
assessments, is seen as a prerequisite for meaningful participation.27
Participatory rights and access to information are also at the heart of the
OECD Principles on Water Governance, which pay particular attention to the
notions of trust and engagement, and are seen as capable of building public
conﬁdence and ensuring the inclusion of stakeholders through democratic
legitimacy and fairness.28 These principles are rooted in ‘broader principles
of good governance: legitimacy, transparency, accountability, human rights,
rule of law and inclusiveness’.29 Finally, and to return to the right to water,
one of the booklets which comprise the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur
Albuquerque’s handbook on the realization of the human rights to water and
sanitation is devoted to access to justice, whilst another focuses on key
principles, including information and participation. In the Handbook, the
operation of the rights of access to information and to participatory decision-
making are developed extensively, and the corresponding duties of States and
the actions they are to take are elaborated in detail. As far as information is
concerned, in addition to their general obligation to disclose information,
public bodies should be obliged to disseminate information and respond to
requests, the law should stipulate clear processes through which applications
for information can be made and provide for independent review bodies, the
24 B Morgan, ‘Turning Oﬀ the Tap: Urban Water Service Delivery and the Social Construction
of Global Administrative Law’ (2006) 17 EJIL 215, 228.
25 UN Doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol I).
26 ILA, Report of the Seventy-First Conference (2004) 334, art 17. 27 Art 18.
28 OECD Ministerial Council (4 June 2015). See in particular principles 5, 7, 8 and 9.
29 ibid 5.
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costs of requesting information should not be a deterrent, and the meetings of
public bodies should be open to the public.30 Regarding participation, it
recommends that people should be involved in detailing the terms of
participation because doing so will determine people’s willingness to
participate. States must create opportunities for participation, enable people
to access participatory processes, guarantee free and safe participation, allow
access to information to enable meaningful participation and oﬀer
opportunities to inﬂuence decision making.31
These examples of procedural safeguards and participatory principles
conﬁrm that the seemingly sophisticated architecture of the procedural
dimension of the right to water found in General Comment 15, and despite
what may be found in domestic legislation may well, as McIntyre put it,
largely involve:
A codiﬁcation… of existing State obligations under general international human
rights law and general international environmental and sustainable development
law, rather than an attempt at progressive development of participatory principles
applying to matters of access to water.32
Such an approach is further conﬁrmed by the commentary to the Berlin Rules, in
which the ILA, recalling the importance of the Aarhus Convention provisions,
as well as those of a number of instruments involving participatory rights,
expresses little doubt that ‘a right to public participation has now become a
general rule of international law regarding environmental management’ and
adds ‘that a right to information exists is now beyond dispute’.33 It is then
rather ironic that whilst there is still controversy regarding the customary
status of the substantive dimension of the right to water, its procedural
dimensions seem to be ﬁrmly established in international law. Perhaps this
lack of controversy is due to the nature of the rights involved. Access to
information rights, to be meaningfully consulted in decision-making
processes and to have some means of redress in order to uphold these rights,
are intimately linked to principles of democratic accountability and thus
naturally conceptualized as civil and political rights. Although they require
the establishment of appropriate regulatory frameworks, they are not
particularly burdensome and thus more easily acceptable and accepted. As
civil and political rights, however, they are of immediate eﬀect and arguably
impose absolute obligations on States. States cannot just ‘take steps’ to
facilitate the circulation of information: information must be imparted. States
cannot simply design a policy encouraging public participation: genuine
30 Realising the Human Rights to Water and Sanitation (n 4), Booklet 7, 37–8.
31 ibid Booklet 7, 57–9.
32 O McIntyre, ‘The Role of the Public and the Human Right to Water’ in Public Participation
and Water Resources Management. Where Do We Stand in International Law? (Conference
Proceedings, Paris, UNESCO, 2015) 140, 145.
33 ILA Berlin Conference (2004) Water Resources Law, Fourth Report, at 25.
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participation must take place. The procedural features of the right to water thus
add a clear civil and political dimension to what is primarily an economic and
social right, thereby conﬁrming the right’s hybrid nature.34
B. The Signiﬁcance of Procedural Safeguards and Participatory Rights for
the Right to Water Discourse
Procedural and participatory rights thus contribute to the customary recognition
of the right to water. However, beyond formal legal recognition, one might
wonder what good it is to be able to participate in water-related decisions in
practice, when the immediate concerns of the most deprived are unlikely to
be the exercise of their democratic or civil and political rights but rather the
securing of access to suﬃcient water to fulﬁl their basic needs. As Ulrich
emphasized, ‘it is diﬃcult for individuals to even exercise civil and political
rights or participate in democracy if they lack suﬃcient water to maintain
minimum standards of health’.35 This diﬃculty calls into question the
signiﬁcance of procedural water rights in contrast to the urgency and critical
need for eﬀective water access for all as a matter of survival and decency.
This distinction is especially true because those most in need, generally the
poor and marginalized, are also those less likely to readily participate in
participatory processes, unlike the richer and more educated communities in
democratic States. Arguably, however, the signiﬁcance of procedural rights
in the right to water discourse should not be underestimated. Procedural
safeguards and participatory rights help to shape the substantive dimension of
the right; they can foster eﬃcient water provision solutions, enhance the
legitimacy of these solutions and help to ensure the accountability of water
actors, thereby contributing to the debate opposing those seeing water as a
commodity versus those seeing water as a public good.
Procedural rights contribute to shaping the substantive right to water. It has
been argued, in relation to the right to a clean environment, that regardless
of how strong this substantive right might appear on paper, it would be
meaningless without the procedural rights necessary to pursue its respect,
protection and promotion.36 These remarks are easily transposable to the
right to water: what good is it to have a substantive right if this right cannot
be vindicated and enforced? Through public participation and enforcement,
individuals exercising their procedural rights thus not only contribute to
vindicating the right but also to shaping its substantive content. They can
help to shape water-related decisions in the participatory process and help to
shape the legal contours of the right when seeking its enforcement. The rise
34 See Thielbörger (n 1).
35 MR Ulrich, ‘The Impact of Law on the Right to Water and Adding Normative Change to the
Global Agenda’ (2015) 48 GeoWashIntlLRev 43, 77–8.
36 See M Soveroski, ‘Environment Rights versus Environmental Wrongs: Forum over
Substance’ (2007) 16(3) RECIEL 261, 261.
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in water-related enforcement actions, facilitated by enhanced access to justice
tools, also contributes to popularizing the debate about the right to water, thus
making judges more comfortable with granting remedies and potentially
embracing the right per se.37 McIntyre thus rightly noted that the public has
‘a signiﬁcant role to play in the eﬀective enforcement and continuing
judicial elaboration of the human right to water concept’38 and that public
participation promotes ‘the substantive values inherent to the human right to
water’.39 These claims are further supported by empirical evidence indicating
positive associations of voice and accountability (ie, mechanisms for
participatory processes and enforcement) with improved access to water.40
The linking of procedural and participatory rights to water to its substantive
dimension is also the result of the capacity to foster more eﬃcient water-
provision solutions through participatory processes.
Eﬀective public participation could well lead to the adoption of more rational
policies and solutions since decision makers will be aware of and more likely to
understand public concerns when designing policies.41 McCaﬀrey and Neville
highlighted particularly well the eﬃciency beneﬁts for water provision derived
from inclusive and empowering participatory processes. They underscored
that fulﬁlment of the substantive dimension of the right to water could
present challenges to resource-scarce governments, but they postulated that
institutionalized forms of participation could constitute a way past these
ﬁnancial barriers and an eﬀective channel through which to develop greater
capacity to provide water.42 Participatory processes could thus be designed to
allow for community-based solutions to water provision, premised on a
collaborative system of water delivery reﬂecting the community’s particular
needs.43 More context-appropriate and eﬀective solutions to water access can
be developed, as people will have been included in assessing their own
needs. This inclusion could, in turn, prevent the construction of facilities ‘that
they do not need, do not use properly, do not care for and to which they are not
ready to contribute’.44 In contrast, empowering participatory processes is more
likely to encourage communities to participate in the construction of appropriate
facilities and enhance their willingness to pay for services from which they
beneﬁt,45 thus assisting the State in fulﬁlling its water provision duties while
partly alleviating the ﬁnancial and other constraints generally associated with
37 See Morgan (n 24) 240. 38 McIntyre (n 32) 142. 39 ibid 146.
40 See PB Anand, ‘Right to Water and Access to Water: An Assessment’ (2007) 19 Journal of
International Development 511, 520.
41 See J Razzaque, ‘Public Participation in Water Governance’ in JW Dellapenna and J Gupta
(eds), The Evolution of the Law and Politics of Water (Springer Science Business Media BV 2009)
355, 356.
42 See SC McCaﬀrey and KJ Neville, ‘Small Capacity and Big Responsibilities: Financial and
Legal Implications of a Human Right to Water for Developing Countries’ (2009) 21
GeoIntlEnvtlLRev 679, 694–5. 43 ibid 698.
44 World Water Council Report, C Dubreuil, The Right to Water: From Concept to
Implementation (2006) 30. 45 See ibid.
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such duties. McCaﬀrey and Neville warned, however, that the development of
participatory processes and community-based solutions should not lead to
governments divesting themselves of the responsibility of water provision.46
This warning is further supported by Albuquerque, who emphasized the risk
that States might delegate service delivery to communities in the name of
participation at the expense of their obligation to ensure that services are
adequate through support, regulation and oversight.47
Another challenge for the development of meaningful participatory processes
is ensuring their inclusive character. Albuquerque pointed out that the
privileged should not dominate participatory processes and that States must
reach out to the disadvantaged and marginalized to encourage their
involvement.48 Provided that such challenges are eﬀectively managed,
participatory processes thus potentially oﬀer signiﬁcant promise for the
provision of eﬃcient water solutions and in turn the fulﬁlment of the right to
water. This potential exists because water-provision solutions based on
participatory processes enhance the viability of policy initiatives and improve
their chances of successful implementation,49 as these solutions beneﬁt from
enhanced legitimacy. Indeed, participatory processes open the system to
include the perspectives of those most aﬀected by the decisions, oﬀering
them an opportunity to buy into the solution.50 Ultimately, local participation
might also increase compliance with regulations and acceptance of the
arrangements in place for water provision.51
Finally, well-designed procedural safeguards ensure the accountability of
water providers, whether public or private entities. Legal accountability
of water providers, in this context, could well also inﬂuence the debate
between water as a commodity versus water as a public good. Private
provision of water services, whether one laments or applauds it, is an
inescapable reality. Morgan noted that there was a 7,300 per cent increase in
private sector water provision between 1990 and 1997.52 This increase has
led to a hotly contested debate over the status of water as a commodity or a
public good. Those in favour of private involvement in water provision argue
that such involvement brings eﬃciency, enhances capital and technical
expertise and is thus able to achieve both access and conservation
objectives.53 The liberalization of the water sector has been legitimized by
the Dublin Statement and Declaration of the World Water Forum, which
reframed water as an economic good.54 However, those who see water as a
46 See McCaﬀrey and Neville (n 42) 699.
47 See Realising the Human Rights to Water and Sanitation (n 4) Booklet 7, 62.
48 ibid 64.
49 See T Paul, ‘Plugging the Democracy Drain in the Struggle for Universal Access to Safe
Drinking Water’ (2013) 20(1) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 469, 496.
50 See McCaﬀrey and Neville (n 42) 703. 51 ibid 704. 52 See Morgan (n 24) 218.
53 SeeMcCaﬀrey andNeville (n 42) 700; J Gupta, R Ahlers and LAhmed, ‘TheHuman Right to
Water: Moving Towards Consensus in a Fragmented World’ (2010) 19 RECIEL 3 294, 300.
54 See Gupta, Ahlers and Ahmed ibid.
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public good and advocate for a human rights approach argue that water sector
liberalization disempowers the poor and that a human rights framework is
capable of moving the discourse from charity to entitlement. It will require
government to prioritize resources for water provision but also provide legal
remedies and accountability processes.55 Private actors, however, have not
traditionally operated subject to respect for the rule of law and other
democratic principles of accountability commonly applicable in most
participatory democracies. Tara Paul perfectly captured the democratic risks
associated with water privatization. She argued that ‘the democracy drain in
privatization of government resources arises from the exclusion of
stakeholders from economic policy decisions that will have immediate eﬀects
on their livelihoods’ and added that:
Commoditization of a public resource reinforces the loss of democracy, as market
forces andmarket incentives become proxies for public interest. Commoditization
of water, if coupled with deregulation and minimal procedures for public input
[…] may allow state actors to avoid tough political choices while private actors
implement market operations with limited political impunity.56
Paul is of the view, however, that privatization could well prove successful if
States engage with good governance mechanisms and regulations, including
procedural safeguards guaranteeing transparency, public participation and
accountability.57 In other words, private provision of water services could
operate within a human rights framework in which private actors are
subjected to democratic accountability principles and are unable to elude
obligations regarding access to information, transparency, participatory
decision-making and other procedural duties traditionally binding public
authorities. Subjecting private providers to participatory rights and procedural
safeguards obligations does not only carry the inherent beneﬁt of ensuring that
private actors respect good governance principles, but it also legitimizes
thinking of water in terms of human rights and access to water in terms
of entitlement rather than need. Ultimately, despite privatization, the broad
reach of procedural and participatory rights further legitimizes the
conceptualization of water as a public good, rather than a commodity.
III. WATER-RELATED PROCEDURAL RIGHTS IN PRACTICE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM
SELECTED HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS
Evidence of water-related procedural practice could arise in a multiplicity
of legal contexts and regimes, including domestic-level implementation,
international funding institutions’ lending practices and compliance
mechanisms (eg, the World Bank Inspection Panel), regional organizations’
legal orders, UN human rights bodies, or international waters or watercourse
55 ibid. 56 Paul (n 49) 473–4. 57 ibid 472.
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regimes. In this more modest study, the focus is on the practice of regional
human rights systems, as well as those of the Compliance Committees to the
Aarhus Convention and of the London Protocol on Water and Health,
because water issues involve inextricable human rights and environmental
concerns. Water is essential to life, health and decent living conditions, but
water scarcity or water pollution also poses critical environmental challenges.
The sophisticated compliance mechanisms of regional human rights systems
thus render them particularly conducive to the development of water-related
procedural practices. This is the case not only because of the human rights
nature of the right to water but also because of the recent trend in the
proceduralization of environmental rights58 and the increased tendency to
bring environmental claims before human rights bodies in the absence of a
compulsory environmental dispute-settlement mechanism. The Aarhus
Convention and London Protocol oﬀer, for their part, compliance solutions
for matters recognized openly at the junction between human rights and
environmental concerns and are thus particularly promising for ﬂeshing out
the procedural dimension of the right to water.
A. The Contribution of Regional Human Rights Systems
This section assesses the contours of the ECtHR’s, IACHR’s and ACHPR’s
approaches to the procedural dimension of the right to water, and it evaluates
the contributions that these bodies make to shaping the right to water’s
procedural safeguards and participatory rights, as well as any potential cross-
fertilization between systems.
1. Water and procedural rights in the ECHR system
a) Procedural framework for environmental and water-related claims
As a civil and political rights instrument, the ECHR does not directly
recognize a human right to water, yet this omission does not mean that the
Court is not regularly faced with water-related issues. These issues are
generally brought as environmental claims and often involve water pollution
or water access issues. Most of these claims have a strong procedural
dimension and are generally litigated under Article 8, protecting the right to
private life, as the most conducive ECHR right for environment-related
claims. Water issues are also sometimes raised, but to a lesser extent, in the
58 See F Francioni, ‘International Human Rights in an Environmental Horizon’ (2010) 21(1)
EJIL 41, 42; Boyle (n 6) 621–6; J Razzaque, ‘Human rights to a clean environment: procedural
rights’ in M Fitzmaurice, D Ong and P Merkouris (eds), Research Handbook on International
Environmental Law (Edward Elgar 2010) 284.
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context of Article 6(1).59 The ECtHR has read an elaborate set of procedural
safeguards into Article 8 in the context of environmental claims, and this
framework is readily applicable and has in fact been applied numerous times
to issues involving water. The main features of this set of standards can be
gleaned from three key cases: Hatton v UK, which concerned noise pollution
aﬀecting residents in the vicinity of Heathrow Airport; Guerra v Italy,
concerning the risks aﬀecting residents by the operation of a nearby chemicals
factory; and Taskin v Turkey, which concerned the granting of permits for the
operation of a gold mine.60 Whilst Hatton and Guerra did not speciﬁcally
involve water issues, Taskin did, which provides it with increased
signiﬁcance. In essence, this set of cases establishes that, when assessing
environmental claims under Article 8, the Court will ensure that a number of
requirements have been met. The ECtHR accepts that Article 8 can apply in
environmental cases, whether the pollution is directly caused by the State or
whether its responsibility arises from the failure to properly regulate private
industry.61 Article 8 thus encompasses positive duties to undertake reasonable
and appropriate measures to secure the right, alongside a prohibition of State
interference. In either case, the applicable principles are broadly similar.62 As
far as governmental decisions aﬀecting environmental issues are concerned,
although the Court can assess both the substantive merits of the decision and
the decision-making process,63 in practice, its scrutiny is mainly focused on
the decision-making process, thus particularly emphasizing the procedural
dimension of environmental claims.64 Despite a lack of explicit procedural
requirements in Article 8, the Court nevertheless expects the decision-making
process to be fair and aﬀords due respect to the interests of the individual.65 It
thus considers ‘all the procedural aspects, including the type of policy or
decisions involved, the extent to which the views of individuals were taken
into account throughout the decision-making process, and the procedural
safeguards available’.66 The ECtHR further reads into Article 8 the duty to
conduct appropriate investigations and studies to evaluate the risks involved
for the environment and to duly balance conﬂicting interests,67 recognizes the
importance of public access to information,68 and requires that the individuals
59 See, for example, Butan and Dragomir v Romania (4 January 2012) App No 6863/09; Zander
v Sweden (25 November 1993) App No 14282/88. Further, in the context of access to water issues
under art 3 on the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, see eg MSS v Belgium
andGreece (21 January 2011) [GC], AppNo 30696/09; Radu vRomania (13October 2009)AppNo
3036/04.
60 Respectively: (8 July 2003) [GC], App No 36022/97, ECHR 2003-VIII; (19 February 1998)
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I; (10 November 2004) App No 46117/99, section 115,
ECHR 2004-X. 61 See Hatton v UK, ibid para 98 at 22. 62 ibid 23.
63 ibid para 99 at 23.
64 Exceptions include the case of Fadeyeva v Russia (7 July 2005) App No 55723/00, ECHR
2005-IV. 65 See Taskin v Turkey (n 60) para 118 at 23.
66 Hatton v UK (n 60) para 104, at 24-25.
67 See Taskin v Turkey (n 60) para 119 at 24.
68 See Guerra v Italy (n 60) para 60 at 228.
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concerned be able to appeal to the courts against any decision if their interests or
comments have not been given suﬃcient weight in the decision-making
process.69 Finally, procedural guarantees might be devoid of useful eﬀect if
judicial decisions remain unenforced or unduly delayed.70
b) Application and development in the water context
Taskin played a central role in synthesizing this sophisticated set of
procedural principles. The case concerned the granting of permits to operate a
goldmine in Ovacık, Turkey, which authorized the use of the cyanide leaching
process for gold extraction. Local residents contested the validity of
the authorization, and after a process of appeal, the Turkish Supreme
Administrative Court found in their favour, holding that the operation of the
mine was not in accordance with the general interest due to the risks to the
environment and human health. However, following a government-initiated
report concluding that the risks referred to by the Supreme Administrative
Court had now been removed or reduced to a level lower than the acceptable
limits, the operating company was later authorized to perform its mining
activities. The applicants alleged that both the decision authorizing the
operation of the mine and the decision-making process were in breach of
Article 8. Interestingly, the Strasbourg Court took inspiration in this ruling
from the Aarhus Convention, which it found to form part of the relevant legal
context applicable to the case.71 The signiﬁcance of this reference cannot be
underestimated since it has been argued that its practical eﬀects have been to
eﬀectively incorporate the Aarhus principles into the right to private and family
life.72 Taskin is thus testimony to the Court’s acceptance that individual
participation in environmental decision-making processes is essential for
compliance with Article 8 of the ECHR.73 Crucially, the case also touched on
water-related claims, as concern was expressed that the operation of the
goldmine would involve the seepage of waste into underground water
supplies. In this particular instance, despite the availability of procedural
safeguards in domestic law, the Court found that these safeguards were
rendered inoperative in light of the delays by the authorities in complying
with judicial decisions ordering the closing of the mine.74
69 See Taskin v Turkey (n 60) para 119 at 24. 70 ibid para 125 at 25.
71 ibid para 99 at 19–20.
72 See Boyle (n 6) 623; E Hey, ‘The Interaction between Human Rights and the Environment in
the European “Aarhus Space”’ in A Grear and LJ Kotzé (eds), Research Handbook on Human
Rights and the Environment (Edward Elgar 2015) 353, 364. Contra: B Peters, ‘Unpacking the
Diversity of Procedural Environmental Rights: The European Convention on Human Rights and
the Aarhus Convention’ (2018) 30(1) JEL 1.
73 See U Beyerlin, ‘Aligning International Environmental Governance with the “Aarhus
Principles” and Participatory Human Rights’ in Grear and Kotzé (n 72) 333, 344.
74 See Taskin v Turkey (n 60) paras 120–125 at 24–5.
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Tatar v Romania75 is another important case for the contours of the
procedural requirements under Article 8 in the context of water. It was
brought to the ECtHR in the wake of an ecological disaster. A goldmine
located in the region where the applicants lived was granted a permit to use
sodium cyanide for its operation. A dam breached, causing the release of
100,000m3 of cyanide-contaminated waters into the environment, thus
aﬀecting health, lives and homes. The applicants complained in particular of
the failure by the authorities to conduct appropriate studies and to inform the
public of the risks posed by the operation of the goldmine. The Court
recalled that the decision-making process must be based on appropriate
environmental assessments and studies evaluating the risks entailed and the
conclusions of such studies being made available to the public. Interestingly,
the Court further detailed the contours of these duties and noted that they
involve informing the public of the risks to health and the environment
entailed by the accident and of any existing preventive and mitigation
measures undertaken.76 Crucially, it also directly derived a right of access to
information from Article 8’s positive duties,77 thereby going one step further
in its case law, which had limited itself thus far to recognizing the importance
of, rather than a right to, access to information.
Dubetska v Ukraine78 concerned water pollution caused by industrial
activities, which prevented the applicants from access to drinkable water for
several years. While the court found the State in breach of its Article 8
obligation for failure to resettle the applicants, it also took the opportunity to
extend its scrutiny over the decision-making process beyond settled case law
by stating that ‘the Court will likewise examine to what extent the individuals
aﬀected by the policy at issue were able to contribute to the decision-making’.79
Such language potentially demands more than simply considering individuals’
views, and it allows for much closer scrutiny of the decision-making process in
terms of public participation. In Di Sarno v Italy,80 while the water claim is
incidental to the central issue of waste management, the case is of interest
because the Court, when discussing the positive duties ﬂowing from Article
8, asserted that ‘the fact that the Italian authorities handed over the
management of a public service to third parties does not relieve them of the
duty of care incumbent upon them under Article 8’.81 This statement is
signiﬁcant because if States can be held responsible for the failure of private
operators to uphold human rights, including procedural standards, then they
might well design regulatory processes ensuring that private parties
delivering a public service are themselves subject to such procedural
requirements. Other cases involving water-related issues involving the
75 (28 January 2009) App No 67021/01, ECHR 2009. 76 ibid para 101.
77 See ibid para 113, ‘Dans le cadre des obligations positives découlant de l’article 8 de la
Convention, la Cour tient à souligner l’importance du droit du public à l’information, tel que
consacré par sa jurisprudence’. 78 (10 February 2011) ibid 30499/03. 79 ibid para 143.
80 (10 January 2012) App No 30765/08. 81 ibid para 110.
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application of the procedural framework designed by the ECtHR include
Giacomelli v Italy,82 Ivan Atanasov v Bulgaria,83 Hardy and Maile v UK,84
Dzemyuk v Ukraine85 and Otgon v Moldova.86 In this last case, the court
asserted that Article 8’s positive obligations include a duty to award
compensation,87 thus arguably making it part of the framework of
procedural safeguards.88 In summary, there is clearly a wealth of litigation
involving water issues before the ECtHR, to which the court has readily
applied a sophisticated procedural framework derived from the positive
obligations contained in Article 8 of the ECHR and partly inspired by the
Aarhus principles.
2. Water and procedural rights in the inter-American human rights system
In contrast to its European counterpart, the IACHR system does recognize the
right of access to safe drinking water that it derives from the right to life, the
right to personal integrity, the right to health and—with respect to indigenous
communities—the collective right to property.89 The Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous
Community v Paraguay case, in which the Court recognized a right to water as a
requirement of a digniﬁed life, also involved the resettlement of communities,
which, according to the Court, ‘will be chosen by agreement with the members
of the indigenous peoples, according to their own consultation and decision
procedures’.90 In fact, it is in the context of indigenous communities’ rights
that extensive procedural requirements have been developed by both the
Commission and the Court, particularly in the context of their right to
collective ownership of their ancestral land under Article 21 of the American
82 (2 November 2006) App No 59909/00. 83 (2 December 2010) App No 12853/03.
84 (14 February 2012) App No 31965/07. 85 (4 September 2014) App No 42488/02.
86 (25 October 2016) App No 22743/07. 87 See ibid para 17.
88 Two further cases,Okyay v Turkey (12 July 2005) App No 36220/97, and Karin Andersson v
Sweden (25 September 2014) App No 29878/09, concerned art 6(1). In the latter, access to justice
was denied because the applicants’ environmental harm claims could not, according to the court,
constitute civil rights.
89 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report 2015, Ch IV Access to Water
in the Americas: An Introduction to the Human Right to Water in the Inter-American System, para
149 at 502. See also I/A Court H.R., Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay.
Interpretation of the Judgment on the Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 6,
2006. Series C No. 142, para 161; I/A Court H.R., Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous
Community v Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of March 29, 2006. Series C
No. 146; I/A Court H.R., Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v Paraguay. Merits,
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010 Series C No. 214, paras 194–217, for the right
to water as a requirement for a digniﬁed life and I/A Court H.R. Case of the Saramaka People v
Suriname. Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs. Judgment of August 12, 2008 Series C No 185 for the right to water deriving from the
right to property. For an analysis see J Murillo Chávarro, ‘The Right to Water in the Case-Law
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2014) 7 ACDI-Anuario Colombiano de Derecho
Internacional 39.
90 I/A Court H.R. Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v Paraguay (n 89)
para 135.
Towards Judicial Coordination for Good Water Governance? 945
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589318000301
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 86.160.175.112, on 09 Aug 2019 at 10:53:01, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
Convention on Human Rights.91 Such procedural safeguards arise in the context
of development projects occurring on indigenous territory or likely to aﬀect their
rights and natural resources, and they are of critical importance in the articulation
of the rights of indigenous communities. Thériault indeed pointed out that ‘the
capacity of indigenous peoples to control the nature and pace of economic
development projects on their territories largely hinges on the relative strength
of their right to participate eﬀectively in the relevant decision-making
processes’,92 and Shelton noted that ‘most eﬀorts to develop norms to balance
the competing interest of the State and indigenous peoples have focused on
procedural rights’.93
In many cases, industrial developments or mineral extraction projects are
likely to have repercussions for the water resources of the communities and
in cases of disputes involve water-related claims. What these procedural
safeguards entail is thus instructive for understanding how they might apply
to the water-related claims of indigenous communities. In this context, the
Court bases itself on the existence of a duty in international law to engage in
prior consultation with indigenous peoples regarding situations that aﬀect
their territory94 to posit generally that:
The right to consultation comprises the positive duty of States to provide suitable
and eﬀective mechanisms for obtaining prior, free, and informed consent in
accordance with the customs and traditions of the indigenous peoples before
undertaking activities that may adversely aﬀect their interests or their rights to
their lands, territory or natural resources.95
The scope of this duty has been distilled in the landmark Saramaka case.96 In
essence, whilst the right to property can be restricted, this restriction is subject to
certain guarantees, notably that such restrictions do not aﬀect the survival of
the indigenous or tribal people concerned in accordance with their traditional
ways of life. The State must thus undertake ‘all appropriate measures to
ensure the continuance of the relationship of the indigenous people with their
land and culture’,97 including the eﬀective participation of the members of the
91 See D Shelton, ‘International Law and the Development of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(Panel 8): The Inter-American Human Rights Law of Indigenous Peoples’ (2013) 35 UHawLRev
937; S Thériault, ‘Environmental Justice and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ in Grear
and Kotzé (n 72) 309. 92 Thériault (n 91) 326. 93 Shelton (n 91) 973.
94 I/A Court H.R. Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador. Merits and
Reparations. Judgment of 27 June 2012. Series C No 245, para 164; I/A Court H.R., Case of the
Community Garifuna Triunfo de la Cruz & its members v Honduras. Merits, Reparations and
Costs. Judgment of 8 October 2015. Series C No 305 para 154.
95 I/A Commission Rep No 76/12 Case 12.548 Merits Garífuna Community of “Triunfo de la
Cruz” and Its Members (Honduras) (2013) para 251. See also Final Merits Rep No 40/04, Case
12.053.Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District (Belize) (12 October 2004) para 142.
96 I/A Court H.R. Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname. Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of 28 November 2007 Series C No 172.
97 I/A Court H.R. Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname. Interpretation of the Judgment on
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of 12 August 2008 Series C No
185, para 29.
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community, in conformity with their customs and traditions, regarding any
development plan; the granting of reasonable beneﬁts; and subjecting any
authorization to prior environmental and social impact assessments.98 The
duty to ensure eﬀective participation entails a right of the tribal peoples to be
involved in the processes of design, implementation, and evaluation of
development projects undertaken on their lands and ancestral territories and a
guarantee that indigenous peoples be consulted on any matters that might aﬀect
them;99 and it must generally be conducted with the goal of reaching agreement.
Crucially, in the context of large-scale developments threatening the physical or
cultural survival of the community, it imposes an obligation of result, not only
to consult but also to obtain the free, prior and informed consent of the
community in accordance with its customs and traditions.100 Here,
participatory rights are stretched so far as to include a requirement of prior
consent, but they also involve diﬀerentiated consultation processes to
accommodate the indigenous communities’ cultures and traditions, thus in
eﬀect guaranteeing an inclusive and eﬀective participation.101 Although these
procedural safeguards are not designed to apply speciﬁcally to water claims,
they might well do so, as pointed out above, in the context of a development
project aﬀecting water resources.
The inter-American system of human rights has thus developed participatory
rights arguably further than the ECtHR, at least as far as the roles of members of
certain communities within the decision-making process are concerned.
However, outside of this context, procedural environmental justice seems to
remain less developed in the Americas than in the European system of
human rights.102 Whilst the Inter-American Court does read a right to access
information into the right to freedom of thought and expression, it still falls
98 I/ACourt H.R.Case of the SaramakaPeople v Suriname (n 96) para 129. I/ACourt H.R.Case
of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador (n 94) para 157.
99 I/A Commission Rep No 76/12 Case 12.548Merits Garífuna Community of “Triunfo De La
Cruz” and Its Members (Honduras) (2013) para 256.
100 See Saramaka case (n 96) and ibid para 257. See also Shelton (n 91) 959–60. On free, prior
and informed consent (FPIC), see further SJ Rombouts, ‘The Evolution of Indigenous Peoples’
Consultation Rights under the ILO and U.N. Regimes’ (2017) 53 StanJIntlL 169, according to
whom ‘FPIC is rooted in the overarching right to self-determination, and therefore denotes a
right of indigenous peoples to eﬀectively determine the outcome of decision-making processes
impacting on them, not a mere right to be involved in such processes’ at 223.
101 See also I/ACourt H.R.,Case of the Community Garifuna Triunfo de la Cruz& ItsMembers v
Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 8 October 2015 Series C No 305, paras
154–161.
102 This lack of development is, however, not set in stone since there are a number of pending
cases before the Commission and the Court involving both water and procedural issues; these cases
include the Yaqui people v Mexico case IACHR, Rep No 48/15, Petition 79-06; the People of
Quishgue-Tapayrihua community v Peru case IACHR, Rep No 62/14, Petition 1216-03; the
Diaguita agricultural communities of the Huasco-Altinos and the members thereof case, IACHR,
Rep No 141/09; the Communities of the Sipakepense and Mam Mayan People v Guatemala case,
IACHRRep No 20/14, petition 1566-07; the Right to access to water of rural communities in Costa
Rica case; and a hearing was held in 2017 on the Right of access to relevant information for the
enforceability of Economic, Social Cultural and Environmental rights.
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short of providing a broader right to participate eﬀectively in environmental
decision making per se,103 in turn restricting the capacity of procedural
claims related to water to ﬂourish beyond the context of indigenous
communities’ collective rights.
3. Water and procedural rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples
Rights’ system
Like the inter-American system, the African system recognizes and protects the
right to water. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has
indeed derived it from the right to health.104 Interestingly, the Commission
has read some procedural requirements into this right, as well as into the right
to a clean environment,105 which could also give rise to water-related claims.
Thus, in the Ogoni people case,106 which concerned allegedly irresponsible
oil developments in which the State of Nigeria participated at the expense of
the health and environment of the Ogoni people, the complainants argued
that the State had violated both the right to health and the right to a clean
environment by directly participating in the contamination of water and
failing to provide studies of the risks that these activities entailed. According
to the Commission:
Government compliance with the spirit of Article 16 and Article 24 of the
African Charter must also include ordering or at least permitting independent
scientiﬁc monitoring of threatened environments, requiring and publicising
environmental and social impact studies prior to any major industrial
development, undertaking appropriate monitoring and providing information to
those communities exposed to hazardous materials and activities and providing
meaningful opportunities for individuals to be heard and to participate in the
development decisions aﬀecting their communities.107
The procedural safeguards envisaged here thus encompass both access to
information and public participation in the decision-making process.
However, the Commission seemed to fall short of imposing the obligation
to require independent scientiﬁc monitoring but only to permit that this
monitoring be conducted. It is also notable that, beyond ﬁnding violations
of Articles 16 and 24, the Commission also concluded that the lack of
103 See Thériault (n 91) 319–21.
104 In Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Sudan, Comm 296/2005, ACHPR/
LPROT and 296/05/674.09 African Commission’s decision 29 July 2009, a right to water was seen
as implicit within the right to health protected in art 16 of the Charter. Further, in Comm 25/89-47/
90-56/91-100/93 Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, Union
Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme, les Témoins de Jehovah v Democratic Republic of the
Congo (4 April 1996) the failure to provide basic services, such as safe drinking water,
constituted a violation of the right to health. 105 Art 24 of the Charter.
106 Comm 155/96 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Centre for Economic
and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria (27 October 2001). 107 ibid para 53.
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involvement of the Ogoni people in the decisions that aﬀected Ogoniland
amounted to a violation of the right of peoples to freely dispose of their
wealth and natural resources, protected by Article 21 of the African Charter.108
In the Endorois People case,109 procedural requirements were further read
into the right to culture110 and the right to development.111 The case involved
the displacement of Endorois communities from their ancestral lands around
Lake Bogoria in Kenya to create a game reserve and operate a ruby mine.
According to the complainants, the Endorois people were not adequately
consulted in these decisions nor appropriately compensated and suﬀered
notably from reduced access to water resources as a result. For the
Commission, the Endorois constitute a people for the purposes of the Charter
and are thus endowed with collective rights, such as the right to freely
dispose of their natural resources, including water sources.112 Interestingly, in
this case, whilst the Commission did not directly recognize a right to water, it
closely integrated water issues into its assessment of the right to development of
the Endorois people. Indeed, the Commission noted that the Endorois were
relegated to semi-arid lands unsustainable for pastoralism because of strict
prohibitions on access to the lake as their traditional water source,113 and it
acknowledged that ‘access to clean drinking water was severely undermined
as a result of loss of […] ancestral land’.114 Taking this into account in its
evaluation of a potential breach of the right to development of the Endorois
people, it also remarked that the right to development is both constitutive and
instrumental and thus entails the respect of some procedural safeguards.115 In
this light, peoples must be able to participate in the development process and
express their choices.116 Borrowing from the Inter-American Court’s case
law and the Saramaka case, the Commission posited that respect for these
safeguards involves a duty to consult with the aﬀected communities, and ‘this
requires the State to both accept and disseminate information, and entails
constant communication between the parties. These consultations must be in
good faith, through culturally appropriate procedures and with the objective
of reaching an agreement.’117 In addition, the Commission was of the view
that for ‘any development or investment projects that would have a major
impact within the Endorois territory, the State has a duty not only to consult
with the community, but also to obtain their free, prior, and informed
consent, according to their customs and traditions’,118 thus following in the
footsteps of its inter-American counterpart.119 There is little doubt that
108 ibid para 55.
109 Comm 276/03 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group
(on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya (25 November 2009).
110 Art 27, see ibid para 243. 111 Art 22.
112 Endorois people case (n 109); see paras 162 and 251–268. 113 ibid para 286.
114 ibid para 288. 115 ibid para 277. 116 ibid. 117 ibid para 289. 118 ibid para 291.
119 This borrowing from the Inter-American Court is in contrast, according to Inman, to the
African system’s usual reluctance to refer to external sources relating to indigenous peoples. See
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inadequate access to water resources weighed on the Commission’s evaluation
of the signiﬁcance of the impact of the development project within the Endorois
territory, triggering the duty to obtain free, prior and informed consent. In the
Commission’s view, the inadequacy of the consultations left the Endorois
feeling disenfranchised from a process of the utmost importance to their life
as a people,120 and ultimately, the failure to provide suitable land for grazing
(which would include adequate sources of water) indicated that Kenya did
not adequately provide for the Endorois in the development process.121
4. Conclusions
In all three systems, water-related claims are subject to some procedural
requirements, but the features of these procedural safeguards vary
signiﬁcantly from one system to the other. Whereas the European human
rights regime aﬀords equivalent importance to all three aspects of procedural
rights, namely, access to information, public participation and access to
justice, the inter-American and African systems place particular emphasis on
the participatory rights of indigenous communities. In this context, the
IACHR, followed by the African Commission, has built an elaborate regime
of eﬀective participation, which can in fact go beyond mere participation and
eﬀectively require the prior informed consent of indigenous communities
regarding development activities occurring within their ancestral lands in
cases where such activities have the potential to threaten their survival. This
stipulation goes further than even the Aarhus Convention’s requirements thus
far. In addition, whereas the ECtHR is mainly concerned with the procedural
rights of individuals and is strongly focused on civil and political rights,122
its American and African counterparts more readily bestow upon water rights
and procedural safeguards a collective dimension.
Francioni rightly criticized the ECtHR’s primarily individualistic focus
as being too reductionist with respect to environmental values and thus
‘adultering their inherent nature of public goods’,123 whilst pleading for
‘a more imaginative and courageous jurisprudence which takes into
consideration the collective dimension of human rights aﬀected by
environmental degradation’.124 In contrast, the practices of the IACHR and
African Commission in relation to indigenous communities represent clear
steps towards the recognition of a common interest in environmental
values through the prism of these communities’ rights over their natural
DK Inman, ‘The Cross-Fertilization of Human Rights Norms and Indigenous Peoples in Africa:
From Endorois and Beyond’ (2014) 5(4) The International Indigenous Policy Journal 2–3.
120 See (n 109) para 297.
121 See ibid para 298. For commentary see J Murphy, ‘Extending Indigenous Rights by Way of
the African Charter’ (2012) 24 PaceIntlLRev 158.
122 Although cases such as Tatar v Romania or Taskin v Turkey refer to the wider community and
residents beyond the applicants. 123 Francioni (n 58) 55. 124 ibid.
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resources.125 Moreover, as far as water is concerned, examining procedural
rights through a collective lens and in particular through the lens of
indigenous peoples’ collective ownership of their land and natural
resources—including water resources—furthers the conceptualization of
water as a common, if not a public, good. Finally, while the Inter-American
Court and Commission and the African Commission cross-refer to each
other’s jurisprudence,126 this is not the case for the ECtHR, at least in so far
as water-related procedural claims are concerned. The ECtHR, however,
makes frequent reference to, and draws inspiration from, the Aarhus
Convention system,127 which serves as a reference point in the design of
procedural rights.
B. Systems Integrating Human Rights and Environmental Concerns
1. The Aarhus Convention’s contribution to water-related claims
That the ECtHR and IACHR128 have not hesitated to refer to the procedural
framework designed under the Aarhus Convention is testimony to the latter’s
participatory rights regime having a broad impact beyond the Aarhus system.
In the European context, Hey argued that the procedural environmental rights
that Aarhus has introduced have ‘shaped a “space” in which human rights and
the environment are able to interact’.129 For Lador, it also provides ‘a solid
reference point for the diverse collection of instruments in the water sector
to develop genuine public participation mechanisms’,130 and from this
standpoint, it is perfectly well placed to inform and feed into the procedural
dimension of the right to water, especially because this Convention on access
to information, public participation in decision making and access to justice in
environmental matters adopts a rights-based approach.131
125 See R Pavoni, ‘Environmental Jurisprudence of the European and Inter-American Courts of
Human Rights: Comparative Insights’ in B Boer (ed), The Environmental Dimension of Human
Rights (Oxford University Press 2015) 31; E Grant, ‘International Courts and Environmental
Human Rights: Re-imagining Adjudicative Paradigms’ in Grear and Kotzé (n 72) 379, 389.
126 The ACHPREndorois case refers to the IACHR Saramaka and Yakye Axa cases. The IACHR
Maya Indigenous Communities case refers to the ACHPR Ogoni people case.
127 This is notably the case in Tatar v Romania, Di Sarno v Italy, Taskin v Turkey and Ivan
Atanasov v Bulgaria, and in Tatar v Romania and Di Sarno v Italy reference to the Convention
features in the court’s assessment rather than only in the section on relevant international
instruments. See also Boyle (n 6) 623 and Hey (n 72) 364.
128 See Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Case of Claude-Reyes et al. v Chile,
Judgment of 19 September 2006. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 129 Hey (n 72) 353.
130 Y Lador, ‘Access to Justice and Public Participation in the Water Sector: A Promising Legal
Development’ in Public Participation and Water Resources Management (n 32) 148, 152.
131 See Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (1998) 2161 UNTS 447, art 1. On the human rights
dimension of the Convention, see Boyle (n 6) 621–6.
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Beyond detailing the minimum procedural safeguards that States must abide
by in the context of environmental decision making and environmental matters,
it does address water issues within its text. The deﬁnition of what constitutes
environmental information in Article 2(3)(a) encompasses any information on
the State and elements of the environment, including, as speciﬁcally mentioned,
its aspects relating to water. This requirement means that water-related
information comes within the scope of Article 4 on the right to request access
to environmental information and Article 5 on the duty for public authorities to
collect and disseminate environmental information. Under Article 6, the public
has a right to participate in decisions on whether to permit a range of activities,
and water matters feature prominently among these, including waste-water
treatment plants,132 inland waterways and ports,133 groundwater abstraction
or artiﬁcial groundwater recharge schemes,134 works for the transfer of water
resources between river basins,135 and dams and other installations designed
for the holding back or permanent storage of water.136 Public participation
will also generally be required for procedures providing for an environmental
impact assessment or any other activity that could have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
environment.137 Under Article 6, public participation must occur early to ensure
that all options are still open and that public participation is eﬀective.138 This
article in turn requires early identiﬁcation of the public concerned and notice
of the proposed decision-making procedure being given including adequate,
timely and eﬀective information on the proposed activity, the nature of
possible decisions, the public authority responsible for the decision and the
participation procedure envisaged.139 In addition the procedure must be
subject to reasonable time frames,140 and all relevant information must be
imparted free of charge as soon as it becomes available.141 The public should
be entitled to submit comments at a public hearing or enquiry.142 These
comments must be duly considered and the public informed promptly of the
decision, as well as of the reasons on which it is based.143 Finally, these
provisions on access to information and public participation, as well as any
other act or omission by a public authority or a private person that
contravenes national law regarding the environment, are subject to the
Convention’s provisions on access to justice.144
The Aarhus Convention’s text alone thus oﬀers a sophisticated procedural
framework that can be readily transposed to water rights and on which the
procedural dimension of the right to water can be modelled. By adopting a
rights-based approach, it also further legitimizes the recognition of the right
to water as a binding legal right, at least in its procedural dimension. This is
132 See ibid Annex 1 para 6. 133 Annex 1 para 9(a). 134 Annex 1 para 10.
135 Annex 1 para 11(a) and 11(b). 136 Annex 1 para 13.
137 See Annex 1 para 20 and art 6(1)(b). 138 Art 6(4). 139 Art 6(2). 140 Art 6(3).
141 Art 6(6). 142 Art 6(7). 143 Art 6(8) and (9). 144 Art 9.
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all the more so as the Compliance Committee to the Aarhus Convention has had
occasion to contribute to further developing these requirements in the context of
water-related claims. The Compliance Committee has received
communications involving water claims in a number of cases, and three of
these are particularly worth mentioning.145 The ﬁrst one found that the
standing requirements built into the Austrian Water Act were too restrictive
and did not meet the test of Article 9(3) of the Convention,146 thereby
vindicating procedural water rights in an international forum. This reading of
the Austrian Water Act was recently conﬁrmed by the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) on the basis of its interpretation of Article 9(3) of
the Aarhus Convention.147 The Protect Natur case originated in a private
company’s application for a permit to draw water from a river to assist the
production of snow for a ski resort, to which the NGO Protect objected. The
Austrian courts referred the case to the CJEU to enquire about the project’s
standing under the Aarhus Convention and EU law.148 The EU Court,
drawing extensively from the Aarhus Convention, found that Article 9(3) of
that Convention, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights (right to an eﬀective remedy), requires environmental
NGOs to be granted standing to contest a decision permitting ‘a project that
may be contrary to the obligation to prevent the deterioration of the status of
bodies of water’ under the EU Water Framework Directive.149 This case
brought to the fore the capacity of the Aarhus Convention to weigh on the
recognition of procedural water rights beyond its own case law through other
judicial fora, in jurisdictions—domestic and international—in which the
Aarhus Convention applies.
The other two communications before the Compliance Committee usefully
feed into the debate on the privatization of water services and more broadly
on water as a commodity versus water as a public good. As discussed above,
the privatization of water services and commodiﬁcation of water can hamper
the applicability of democratic accountability principles, participatory rights
and procedural safeguards since private water contractors can be seen as
primarily accountable to their shareholders and can argue that they are
145 ACCC/C/2008/24 Spain 2011; A/CCC/C/2009/6/ Spain 2009; A/CCC/C/2010/48 Austria
2012; A/CCC/C/2010/51 Romania 2014; A/CCC/C/2011/63 Austria 2014; A/CCC/C/2012/71
Czechia 2016; A/CCC/C/2009/37 Belarus 2010 and A/CCC/C/2010/55 UK. On the dual
contribution of the Compliance Committee to human rights and the environment, see C Pitea,
‘The Non-Compliance Procedure of the Aarhus Convention: Between Environmental and Human
Rights Control Mechanisms’ (2006) 16(1) ItalYBIntlL 85.
146 A/CCC/C/2010/48 Austria. Art 9(3) requests that parties ensure that members of the public
have access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private
persons and public authorities that contravene national law provisions relating to the environment
147 Case C-664/15 (17 December 2017).
148 Because the EU is a party to the Aarhus Convention and operates on the basis of an automatic
treaty incorporation model, the Aarhus Convention forms an integral part of EU Law. On the legal
eﬀects of EU Agreements, see generally M Mendez, The Legal Eﬀects of EU Agreements (Oxford
University Press 2013) 61–76. 149 Case C-664/15 (n 147) para 58.
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immune to the international human rights framework, including in its
participatory and procedural dimensions.150 Should water be considered a
commodity rather than a public good, then such a position might well be
justiﬁed. In contrast, conceptualizing water as a public good would assist in
concluding that private water providers are delivering a public service and, as
such, are subject to the same procedural safeguards as any other public authority
delivering public services. In this context, the Aarhus Convention text already
posits that its obligations fall on public authorities, as well as any natural or legal
person performing public administrative functions under national law, having
public responsibilities or functions, or providing public services provided that
they are under the control of a public authority.151 Arguably then, water utilities
companies fall under this deﬁnition and are thus expected to comply with all of
the procedural safeguards laid out in the Convention, unless water provision is
not itself deﬁned as a public service. This very issue arose in a communication
concerning the UK in connection with access to information held by privatized
water companies, although it was then withdrawn further to a domestic court
decision.152 The matter was indeed concomitantly brought before the British
courts, the water companies denying that they were under a duty to provide
information because they did not fall under the category of public authorities
for the purposes of these requests.153 Following a preliminary ruling from
the CJEU, the British Upper Tribunal, however, concluded that the water
companies were public authorities for the purposes of the Aarhus
Convention, and they thus had a duty to comply with access to information
requests.154 This decision was welcome, conﬁrming that private water
contractors are subject to the requirements of the Aarhus Convention and
must abide by the procedural safeguards built into the right to water,
thereby also supporting the conceptualization of water as a public good. In
the same context, in a communication against Belarus, the communicants
alleged that Belarus had failed to make information available and to consult
adequately with the public in relation to the development of a hydropower
plant project involving the construction of a dam. Under Belarus law, it is
the project developers’ responsibility to conduct environmental impact
assessments, inform the public about the project and conduct the public
participation process.155 In this respect, the committee recognizes that
functions related to public participation can be delegated to various bodies
or private persons, but these bodies should be treated as public authorities
in the performance of these duties.156 It nevertheless was of the view that
150 See Gupta, Ahlers and Ahmed (n 53) 300. 151 See art 2(2).
152 A/CCC/C/2010/55 UK.
153 Fish Legal v Information Commissioner and others [2015] UKUT 52 (AAC).
154 ibid.
155 Findings and Recommendation with regard to Comm A/CCC/C/2009/37 concerning
compliance by Belarus (adopted 24 September 2010), ECE/MP.PP/2011/11/Add.2 paras 22–23.
156 ibid para 78.
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the developers cannot ensure the degree of impartiality necessary to guarantee
proper conduct of the participation procedure, and reliance on providing
public participation cannot be solely placed on the developer.157 If
developers are involved in the process, it must be under the control of the
public authorities, but their role must be supplementary to those of public
authorities.158 In short, where private parties are responsible for conducting
public participation duties, they are public authorities in the performing of
such functions but must in any case remain under the supervision of public
authorities to guarantee impartiality. Public authorities and the State
more generally can thus not relinquish their responsibilities regarding
procedural safeguards and participatory rights onto private providers or the
community.159
The sophisticated participatory rights framework set out by the Aarhus
Convention thus makes it an obvious reference point for the development
of procedural water rights. This suitability does not only stem from the
Convention’s provisions, which make direct references to participatory rights
in water contexts but also from the jurisprudence of its Compliance
Committee, which has involved water-related issues. As in other human rights
systems, the Convention generally requires respect for procedural rights
in relation to the development of projects, plans and policies impacting
natural resources, including water resources. The Compliance Committee’s
jurisprudence has, for its own part, contributed to strengthening access to
justice in the context of water claims and has conﬁrmed the participatory
transparency and accountability duties of private water providers, thus feeding
into the commodity versus public good debate. The resonance of the Aarhus
framework for participatory water rights also extends to wider legal contexts
through the intended universal reach of the Convention and through its
inﬂuence on other legal systems, such as that of the EU. The CJEU’s
progressive decisions related to the procedural dimension of water claims
have indeed been grounded in the requirements of the Aarhus Convention.
The Convention could also inﬂuence the interpretation of other water-related
conventions, and it was argued that the UNECE Convention on the Protection
and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes ‘is nowadays
increasingly interpreted and applied in the light of the concepts and principles of
the Aarhus Convention’.160 Equally, it is a natural point of reference for the
interpretation of the London Protocol on Water and Health to the same
Convention.
157 ibid para 80. 158 ibid para 81.
159 On the issue of privatization in the Aarhus context, see J Ebbesson, ‘Public Participation and
Privatisation in Environmental Matters: An Assessment of the Aarhus Convention’ (2011) 4
Erasmus Law Review 71.
160 S Vykhryst, ‘Public Information and Participation under the Water Convention’ in A Tanzi
et al. (eds),TheUNECEConvention on the Protection andUse of TransboundaryWatercourses and
International Lakes (Brill 2015) 268, 268.
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2. The promise oﬀered by the London Protocol on Water and Health to
procedural water rights
The 1999 Protocol to the Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes oﬀers great promise for
the further development of procedural water rights. It sets itself as an
objective the protection of human health and well-being through improving
water management and the tackling of water-related diseases,161 to be
achieved by aiming to provide access to drinking water and sanitation to
everyone.162 While it does not explicitly refer to the right to water,163 it has
been argued that it implicitly accepts the obligations of States in this
regard164 and in fact ‘translates into binding treaty law pertaining to water
law most, if not all, of the regulatory features emerging from the various
instruments making up the human rights process in the matter in hand’.165
From the point of view of the procedural rights features of the Protocol,
McIntyre noted that ‘it is diﬃcult to imagine a clearer statement in support of
a perspective which views the human right to water concept largely in terms of
increasingly pervasive good governance values’.166 According to Tanzi and
Iapichino, the participatory requirements set out in General Comment 15 are
indeed incorporated in the Protocol,167 especially in the context of the targets
developed by States that must be devised on the basis of a process of public
participation.168 This opinion is supplemented by a due diligence obligation to:
Make available to the public such information as is held by public authorities and
is reasonably needed to inform public discussion of: (a) The establishment of
targets […] and the development of water management plans […]; (b) The
establishment, improvement or maintenance of surveillance and early-warning
systems and contingency plans […]; (c) The promotion of public awareness,
education, training, research, development and information… .169
The information must bemade available within a reasonable time, and its access
must be free of charge.170 Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 10, however, provide
for a long list of exceptions to the obligation to provide access to information,
including to protect the conﬁdentiality of commercial or industrial
161 UN Doc MP.WAT/AC.1/1999/1, art 1. 162 See art 6(1).
163 Aside from an incidental reference in art 5(2)(m).
164 Gupta, Ahlers and Ahmed (n 53) 295.
165 A Tanzi and L Iapichino, ‘The Added Value of the UNECE Protocol onWater and Health for
the Implementation of the Right to Drinking Water and Sanitation’ in H Smets (ed), The
Implementation of the Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation in Europe (Académie de
l’eau France 2011) 115, 117. For another useful analysis, see E Hey, ‘Distributive Justice and
procedural Fairness in Global Water Law’ in J Ebbesson and P Okowa (eds), Environmental Law
and Justice in Context (Cambridge University Press 2009) 351, 355–8.
166 O McIntyre, ‘The UNECEWater Convention and the Human Right to Access to Water: The
Protocol on Water and Health’ in Tanzi et al. (n 160) 345, 365.
167 See Tanzi and Iapichino (n 165) 118. 168 See art 6 (2) and (5). 169 Art 10(1).
170 See art 10 (2) and (3).
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information.171 Despite these restrictions, beyond catering to participatory
rights, the Protocol also promotes transparency via access to information.
Finally, accountability and justiciability are ensured by the establishment, in
addition to traditional dispute settlement options,172 of a compliance
mechanism modelled on that of the Aarhus Convention.173 Like its Aarhus
counterpart, the Compliance Committee under the London Protocol174
can hear communications from the public irrespective of whether the
communicant has been a direct victim of the facts complained of in the
communication.175 The very existence of the Compliance Committee,
combined with these ﬂexible standing requirements, thus make it a promising
forum for the vindication of the water-related transparency and participatory
provisions of the Protocol and, in turn, the consolidation of the procedural
dimension of the right to water.176
IV. CONCLUSIONS: JUDICIAL CROSS-FERTILIZATION AND THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF
WATER AS A PUBLIC GOOD
While we await case law from the London Protocol Compliance Committee, the
practice of regional human rights regimes and of the Aarhus Convention
Compliance Committee show that water-related claims frequently arise in the
context of procedural rights litigation, or they are at least often addressed
from the angle of their procedural dimensions. Arguably, the civil and
political nature of the procedural dimension of the right to water makes it
more readily justiciable. The legally binding nature of procedural rights is
indeed less contested, and procedural safeguards built into the right to water
can be seen as less burdensome to comply with than their substantive
counterpart of providing access to safe drinking water to all. The rise in the
justiciability of water claims through the medium of their procedural
dimension contributes to legitimizing a judicial discourse and, to some
extent, a judicial dialogue on the right to water.177 As judges become more
acquainted with water rights claims, they become more comfortable with
recognizing a human right to water and ﬂeshing out both its procedural and
its substantive features.
The combined case law of regional human rights systems and the Aarhus
Compliance Committee contributes to wide judicial recognition of the
applicability of principles of transparency, participation and accountability to
water issues. Although it might still be too early to speak of a coherent
approach,178 the seeds for constructive cross-fertilization towards coherence
171 See art 10(5)(d). 172 See art 20. 173 See art 15.
174 See Decision 1/2 on Review of Compliance, Doc ECE/MP.WH/2/Add.3 – EUR/06/
5069385/1/Add.3. 175 See Tanzi and Iapichino (n 165) 120.
176 It has so far received one communication only relating to Portugal’s reporting obligations.
177 For a study on international judicial dialogue, see C Romano, ‘Deciphering the Grammar of
the International Jurisprudential Dialogue’ (2009) 41 NYUJIntlL&Pol 755.
178 See Lador (n 130) 149.
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have been sown. Each regime’s practice relating to the procedural dimension of
water-related claims oﬀers a fertile ground from which other systems can
borrow to complement their own. Whilst the African Commission is opening
up to cross-regional dialogue, the Inter-American Court has not shied away
from using the ECHR as a point of reference.179 The set of procedural
environmental safeguards developed by the Strasbourg Court via the
incorporation of the Aarhus Convention principles into its Article 8 could
thus legitimately provide a model upon which both the American and African
systems of human rights could expand participatory rights beyond the
indigenous communities context and broaden the reach of procedural
safeguards to other water-related claims. That the Aarhus Convention
principles are not intended to be limited to the European sphere but rather to
project their inﬂuence globally could further bolster this cross-system
inﬂuence.180 Conversely, the ECtHR could take inspiration from its
American and African counterparts and contribute further to the
conceptualization of water as a common good.
In the inter-American and African regimes, participatory water rights take on
a collective dimension, since it is through the prism of group rights over their
natural resources that participatory and procedural safeguards are activated. It is
water as a common resource of the group—ie, as a common good—that triggers
the applicability of the set of participatory rights granted to indigenous
communities. The collective dimension of participatory rights makes sense
since the right to be informed or to participate in decision making concerning
plans, projects or activities that have a potential environmental or water-related
impact is not in the sole interest of individuals but rather is in the interest of
whole communities that might be aﬀected by these projects and activities.
These communities have a common interest in water-related decisions, and in
this sense, the collective features of procedural water rights further cement a
conceptualization of water as a public good. Ironically, the IACHR’s
interpretation of the right to property also consolidates a vision of water as a
collective good.181 The ‘porosity’182 of the notion of property has indeed
allowed the Inter-American Court to infer a right to the collective property of
indigenous communities over their water resources. By extension and beyond
the indigenous communities’ context, even when the distribution of water is in
private hands, water might thus still be perceived as collectively owned by
communities.
179 See A Di Stasi, ‘The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of
Human Rights: Towards a ‘Cross Fertilization?’ (2014) Ordine internazionale e diritti umani 97.
For Higgins, these two regional human rights courts often adopt a coordinated approach. See R
Higgins, ‘A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 4 791, 798.
180 Although the Convention has been concluded under the auspices of the UN Economic
Commission for Europe (ECE) and currently has 47 parties, it is open to accession by any non-
ECE countries. 181 See section III.A.2.
182 Borrowed fromAGrear, ‘HumanRights, Property and the Search for “Worlds Other”’ (2012)
3(2) JHRE 173, 184–5.
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Further coherence might yet be infused into the nascent regime of procedural
water rights through the diﬀusion of the Aarhus Convention’s generous practice
regarding the deﬁnition of public authorities and their related responsibilities.
The broad scope granted to the notion of public authority limits the capacity
of private providers to escape democratic safeguards and ensures the eﬀective
guarantee of procedural and participatory rights in light of the public interest in
the ‘good’—ie, water—that they are distributing. Modelling the human rights
regimes’ case law for public authorities on the expansive interpretation oﬀered
by the Aarhus system would thus usefully complement the conceptualization of
water as a public good. Beyond the potential systematization of the perception
of water as a public good, increased convergence across the regional human
rights and Aarhus systems undeniably contributes to the construction of a
common and coherent regime of good water governance.183
Finally, the judicial practice of all of the regimes reviewed also clearly
conﬁrms, beyond the human rights dimension, the environmental dimension
of the right to water. Water-related issues are indeed constantly examined as
environmental claims in the ECHR context. The Aarhus and London
Protocol systems explicitly link human rights and the environment. Further,
as far as the ACHPR and IACHR are concerned, indigenous peoples’ water
claims in relation to their lands often involve not only access issues but also
depletion as a natural resource or water pollution.184 Ultimately, this
strengthening of the procedural dimension of the right to water and the
recognition of its close connection to environmental issues provide the
potential to strongly inﬂuence the development of another closely connected
area of law, that of international water management.185
183 As Beyerlin rightly pointed out, ‘Themore the Aarhus principles and the participatory human
rights are aligned with each other in essence, the greater the chance that in future both features may
grow into a double-tracked concept that may be named “participatory equity’’.’ See Beyerlin (n 73)
352. 184 See in particular the Ogoni people case (n 105).
185 OMcIntyre, ‘The Proceduralisation and Growing Maturity of International Water’ (2010) 22
(3) JEL 475.
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